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Abstract 
This paper uses virtue ethics to discuss the COVID-19 outbreak, Hollywood science-
fiction/pandemic films, and the environmental crisis. We outline the ideas of hubris and 
nemesis and argue that responding to the COVID-19 pandemic requires that we develop 
virtues. We will explore these ethical issues through an eco-reading (Hiltner 2018) of two 
popular films cinematic representation of pandemics, The Andromeda Strain (1971) and 
Contagion (2011). Fictional narratives are particularly adept at celebrating the moral and 
intellectual virtues of individuals (as is standard in Hollywood cinema) and dramatizing 
the tensions inherent in human scientific and technological civilisation. Using examples 
from our texts and with reference to COVID-19, we begin with a discussion of virtues and 
vices, both individual and collective, we then explore the concept of flourishing and apply 
this framework to collective action problems such as climate change and COVID-19. Thus, 
science fiction can provoke new forms of environmental philosophising and ethical 
engagement, while addressing the most important challenges facing humanity at present. 
 
 
Virtue may be defined as a habit of mind (animi) in harmony with reason and the 
order of nature. 
 – Cicero, De Inventione 
Introduction 
In Greek myth, Hubris provokes Nemesis. It was Nemesis that led Narcissus to his 
death—falling in love with his own reflection in a pool—as retribution for his vanity. It 
is hubris—the vice of pride—that is most characteristic of humanity’s attitude towards 
the Natural world. COVID-19 (as we commonly call the severe acute respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus 2 [SARS-CoV-2]) suggests that Nemesis might not be far away. 
To talk about hubris, is to talk about vice, i.e. to adopt the language of virtue 
ethics. Virtue ethics has enjoyed something of a renaissance in recent decades and has 
begun to be applied in environmental contexts. Traditionally, virtue ethics is concerned 
with character, with the way our character informs our actions, and the way in which 
character can help us achieve a good. Environmental virtue ethics stresses the 
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importance of a healthy natural environment for human flourishing. The abominable 
and self-destructive treatment of the natural environment arises in some ways from a 
defect in our characters, from our vices. This is not to say that political choices, market 
forces, and other systemic factors have no role. They too instantiate vices and 
encourage vicious behaviour. Vices are generally considered to harm the person who 
possesses the vice and to harm those around them too.  
 This paper discusses virtues and vices in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic and 
uses two films—Contagion (2011) and The Andromeda Strain (1971)—to explore these 
issues. First, virtues and vices are briefly introduced. Our perspective on virtue theory is 
predominantly Aristotelian, though our discussion is informed by recently developed 
environmental virtue theories. Following that we explore the ways in which COVID-19 
has illuminated both individual and collective vices. We use Contagion as a guide for this 
discussion. Following that we turn to virtues, using The Andromeda Strain as a guide. 
We bring these discussions together in a discussion of the ways in which the virtues 
explored can and should frame the shape of society, either post-COVID or as we learn to 
live with the disease. This discussion then leads us to the importance of humility in 
terms of our place in the natural environment and the importance of narratives we tell 
about that place. The two cinematic texts chosen both celebrate and question the 
dominant narratives of Western civilisation—raising questions that the real-world 
COVID-19 pandemic has made all the more urgent.  
Virtue and Vices 
Virtues and vices are derivative—insofar as a practice helps you achieve the good, it is 
virtuous; insofar as it hinders your achieving the good, it is vicious. Virtue ethics 
approaches are adept at determining which responses are appropriate, and which 
inappropriate. Conceptually, when we want to discuss a virtue or a vice, we will look for 
a stable trait of character, not just a particular act. So, for example, I might act in a brave 
manner once, but this would not mean I have the virtue of being brave. Similarly, I 
might act in a gluttonous way, but if this is out of character, we would not describe me 
as having the vice of gluttony.  
Additionally, virtue ethics is usually concerned with some conception of the 
Good. The goal of character and actions is to achieve this good—the telos. Institutions, 
practices and systems should also aim towards this telos. The good is variously 
conceived, depending on the theory. For Aristotle, it was eudaimonia, usually translated 
as “happiness” or “flourishing.” What counts as flourishing can be known and should be 
the goal of one’s life. Flourishing is the telos as it is considered to be the only 
unconditional value in Aristotelian virtue ethics, and virtues are traits of character or 
practices that help in pursuit of the good.  
Virtues are tendencies or dispositions that people possess (though we might also 
apply virtue to the theory of political institutions, corporations, and economic and 
political systems). “A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of 
which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the 
lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving such goods” (MacIntyre 1981, 222). 
A virtue is a trait of character, or capacity or power—it is a specific excellence. “The 
virtue of a thing or being is what constitutes its value, in other words, its distinctive 
excellence” (Comte-Sponville 2003, 2). There are myriad virtues and they will often be 
intertwined. Examples of these would be prudence, humility, and temperance.  
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 By contrast a vice is usually considered to harm the person possessing the vice, 
and harm other people or the wider community. Vice is seen “as contradicting and 
eventually undermining reason, hence destroying our ability to understand our proper 
place in the world and act morally” and “cutting us off from reality or at least from what 
is most important in life” (Cafaro 2005, 137). Those who are dominated by their vices, 
or a society that is predominantly vicious in nature, will eventually regret acting on 
their vicious impulses. Similar to virtues, there are multiple vices, and just like virtues, 
they are intertwined. Examples of vices include imprudence, hubris, and self-
indulgence. In the next section, we discuss Steven Soderbergh’s 2011 film Contagion in 
relation to both COVID-19 and vice. 
Contagion 
Pandemic films can be read as focusing on human virtue and vice, both individual and 
collective. Whilst pandemics undermine the possibility of human flourishing, fictional 
pandemics can enhance the possibility of flourishing by providing their audiences with 
a “dress rehearsal” for real events. Of course, pandemics are caused by the flourishing of 
something inimical to humanity, as we will discuss below. As such, stories about 
pandemics can act as salutary reminders of our proper places in the world. They 
dramatise tensions between human scientific success and the unexpected fragility that 
novel diseases reveal in our societies. Stephen Soderbergh’s Contagion combines 
traditional personal vices with scientific collective vices in its opening scenes, and offers 
a cinematic point of reference for considering the impact of a virus on society.  
 Contagion (2011) tells the story of a pandemic caused by a respiratory virus 
called MEV-1 in a realistic manner. It follows a variety of characters to provide a 
panoramic view of the impact of a virus on contemporary society. Thematically and 
stylistically, Contagion is a kind of sequel to Traffic (2000). Both movies employ a 
stripped-down realist visual style and hyperlink narrative to emphasise the immediacy 
of their topic, and to show the complex relationships that link distant places and 
government attempts to respond to the threats against social order and public health 
that result as greed overwhelms the economic opportunities created by global 
networks. The audience initially experience the pandemic from a domestic perspective, 
as patient zero, Beth Emhoff (Gwyneth Paltrow) returns to her family in Chicago. 
Following her death and the spread of the virus, we watch as the centres of disease 
control and various scientists and other officials attempt to understand and respond to 
the virus. Alongside these perspectives we also follow a blogger, Alan Krumwiede (Jude 
Law). The film’s main villain (besides the virus itself), Krumwiede questions the 
motives of the government response and uses his online presence to promote Forsythia, 
a flowering plant used in traditional Chinese medicine, as an effective treatment. Within 
the conspiracy fantasy world, even with this virulent real virus sweeping the world, 
rumours of Chinese experimentation and monetisation of potential antidotes 
monopolise social media, as unscrupulous individuals look for some fruitful avenue for 
publicity. 
 The film utilises a hyperlink structure that cuts back and forth between the 
characters in the manner of movements through the internet, governed by what Lev 
Manovich calls nonlinear database logic (see Smart Cinema, Brereton 2012). The film 
shows us other victims of the virus who also encountered it in the casino and are now 
transmitting the disease as they travel to different parts of the world. A vaccine is finally 
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developed, following Dr. Ally Hextall’s (Jennifer Ehle) decision to bypass research ethics 
norms, but not before millions have died. The film concludes by showing us Day 1—the 
spillover event. We see forests in China being cleared, forcing bats from their natural 
environment. One bat ends up near domesticated pigs, one of which eats fruit dropped 
by the bat, allowing the virus to jump species. The virus jumps species once again, when 
the chef who prepares the slaughtered pig in Macau shakes hands with Beth Emhoff 
who subsequently becomes infected.  
 Contagion is an ideal vehicle for us to contemplate the vices leading to and 
arising from a pandemic; and from the perspective of 2020’s pandemic, it is uncannily 
prescient. Art constantly reimagines notions of virtue and vice, providing historical 
contextualisation of both virtue and vice. This is not to say that “film” enacts 
philosophical concepts in a pure way, but that films can provide narratives that allow 
the exploration of philosophical ideas, irrespective of whether this is not entirely 
intentional or not. As such, film provides a perfect vehicle for the exploration of vice. 
Central to a vice is that it harms others, and harms those also with the vice. Hubris 
harms those who possess it by preventing them from seeing themselves clearly, it can 
lead to an excessive self-regard, to an overestimation of one’s capabilities, and an 
underestimation of their possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities. In terms of viewing 
others, hubris can cause the individual to undervalue others, to ignore or dismiss harm 
done to others (particularly if done by the hubristic person), and ultimately to ignore 
their status as moral equals. Imprudence means making decisions carelessly, lacking 
practical wisdom, and failing to deliberate wisely about practical matters. A lack of 
prudence even risks corrupting the other virtues (e.g., being brave to the point of 
recklessness or allowing temperance to slide into life-denying asceticism). 
 In Contagion, we see evocations of hubris demonstrated both individually and 
collectively. Krumwiede spends the movie promoting a bogus cure (forsythia) seemingly 
believing that he can spread falsehoods with impunity, even whilst endangering 
people’s lives and public order (people attempting to obtain forsythia overwhelm 
pharmacies and riot). Krumwiede is characterised by greed—defined as “an excessive 
desire to acquire or possess more than what one needs or deserves, especially with 
respect to material wealth” (Cafaro 2005, 147)—and hubris in that he relishes his new 
found fame and influence. He is then a dramatic “antidote” to the rationality of 
science—he offers the quick fix, the easy solution that all of us want at some point. He is 
eventually arrested for fraud—undone by his own hubris, imprudence and greed.  
The response to the current COVID-19 pandemic exhibits many of the same 
failings. These are most apparent in the US. The world’s richest economy had at the time 
of writing, the highest number of deaths (567,000), the world’s 14th highest deaths per 
capita. Political leadership in the US was initially noticeably lacking—ex-President 
Trump suggested that COVID-19 would disappear like a “miracle,” suggested injecting 
bleach, promoted hydroxychloroquine (an anti-malarial drug) as a cure, implied that 
states imposing restrictions on movement needed to be liberated, and that the wearing 
of masks (designed to protect others) was worthy of contempt. Not only this, but the 
Republican Party hosted a garden party that turned out to be a super-spreader event, 
and the President himself contracted the disease. This perspective is not unique to the 
US, of course.  
 The position that COVID-19 should be allowed to spread as the economic costs 
are so high suggests a dominant cultural trait. Indeed, “herd immunity” (where enough 
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of the population becomes immune to a disease with the result that transmission of the 
disease fizzles out) has only ever been achieved using vaccination (Lawton 2020). 
Global politics are excessively focused on economic growth even when the 
consequences of unchecked growth are so ruinous. Wall Street’s (1987) Gordon Gekko’s 
mantra of “Greed is Good” is now a truism. However, the economic arguments—at least 
where COVID-19 is concerned—are not as simple as they seem. Real suffering will 
result from economic decline, and not every instance of economic concern is an example 
of the vice of greed. Imprudent measures that alienate the public are likely to be 
ineffective. The resistance of Manchester in the UK to the imposition of a harsher 
lockdown than existed in other parts of the UK taps into already extant grievances 
about the unequal distribution of wealth in that country (Blake 2020). Those that are 
incapable of conceiving that they might be mistaken are more likely to act imprudently. 
Thus hubris can beget imprudence. Hubris is more blatant and less nuanced. 
Illustrations of hubris in relation to COVID-19 are numerous. Confronting a viral 
pandemic by denouncing experts such as Dr Antony Fauci, the director of the National 
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), is an egregious example of a 
politician with no epidemiological experience presuming to ignore the warnings of an 
expert. Similarly, in Ireland, the government ignored advice from the National Public 
Health Emergency Team to enter the strictest level of lockdown in early October 2020 
(Lehane 2020), only to see infections rise significantly and enter the strictest level a 
fortnight later (RTE 2020). Acts of hubris have, at the very least, exacerbated the impact 
of COVID-19.  
The casual disregard for science displayed by, for instance, the US leadership is 
best characterised as a form of imprudence. Ex-President Trump’s willingness to 
endanger others by going for a drive to wave to supporters outside the Walter Reed 
Hospital when still infectious lacks empathy and endangers those who were forced to 
accompany him. Contagion’s depiction of the response of a vicious individual to a 
pandemic is, as it turns out, optimistic—Krumwiede, for all his flaws, is not ultimately in 
charge of a nation’s response to a novel disease. Perhaps even more happily, he gets his 
comeuppance in the end.  
Contagion also examines our collective response, illustrating how a severe 
outbreak will undermine the possibility of collective flourishing. Contagion portrays 
riots (as mentioned) and a general breakdown of law and order. Thus far, the real 
response to COVID-19 (a less lethal disease than that in the film) has (thankfully) not 
been marked by riots and a general break-down in law and order. Nonetheless, the 
movie does illustrate a collective vice that not only has contributed to the emergence of 
COVID-19 but also risks undermining our collective flourishing over the next century 
and beyond: namely humanity’s imprudent disregard for the natural world. Contagion 
supports this view of human intrusion on nature as a primary cause of disease in its 
final scene, which shows a bulldozer working on a development project in China, felling 
a palm tree, disturbing an infected bat that contaminates a pig in a nearby farm and 
setting in motion the core elements which kick-started the virus. Once the pig is 
prepared in the Macau casino kitchen, the disease jumps to humans. With the 
international jet travel that subsequently spreads the virus, Contagion dramatises Jim 
Robbins’ assertion that “emerging diseases have quadrupled in the last half century, 
largely because of increasing human encroachment into habitat” (Robbins 2012). We 
will return to this vice in the final section of the paper. 
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To focus on vices, is, to some extent, to invert the focus of virtue theory, which aims to 
promote some desirable goal. The goal of characters and actions is to achieve this 
good—the telos. Institutions, practices and systems should also aim towards this telos. 
The good is variously conceived, depending on the theory. For Aristotle, it was 
eudaimonia, usually translated as “happiness” or “flourishing.” Flourishing can be 
known and should be the goal of one’s life. Clearly a pandemic, such as COVID-19, is not 
conducive to any concept of human flourishing (though this might benefit the rest of 
nature). Films focused on pandemics will also celebrate certain virtues, essential for 
flourishing. To illustrate this, we focus on The Andromeda Strain.  
 Directed by Robert Wise1, The Andromeda Strain is based on a novel and 
screenplay by the prolific and often ecologically provocative author Michael Crichton, 
who went on to write Jurassic Park (1990). The story begins with an aerial view of the 
small remote village of Piedmont in New Mexico. An elite scientific and military team is 
gathered to investigate the mysterious deaths of everyone in Piedmont—bar a drunken 
old man and a crying baby—with everyone appearing dead from a mysterious “virus.”2 
The team locate a satellite which has crashed to Earth carrying an alien microbe. They 
are brought to the remote “Wildfire” base in Nevada to research the microorganism. As 
the team becomes metaphorically and physically cleansed in preparation for an 
investigation of the virus within a secret underground research laboratory, the audience 
is treated to a technical display of scientific instrumentation and an evocative use of 
colour and architectural space within a carefully structured mise-en-scène, comparable 
to the clinical delights of Kubrick's 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968). Surveying the 
survivors from within their protective life-suits, and examining the alien life force from 
behind glass screens and banks of monitors, audiences are forced to confront the 
unseen “horror.” All the sophisticated technology mediating the alien's Otherness does 
not provide a language to decode its awesome strangeness. All the investigators are left 
with are humorous platitudes like “it's getting bigger,” as they attempt to “test” the 
molecules with their (un)sophisticated instrumentation. Unlike life on this planet, which 
is implicitly understood and apparently fully appreciated, this alien life does not 
conform to (eco)logical patterns, particularly on leaving no waste of any type and 
surviving within apparently non-nurturing conditions. Like the Borg in the Star Trek 
franchise, its indescribable life force cannot be destroyed by “conventional force”—a 
fact which greatly upsets the logical, ordered, scientific minds of the investigators who 
can only comprehend organisms that conform to planetary ecological rules. This 
willingness to adapt ideas when presented with new information—even information 
                                                        
1 He also directed the classic science fiction film The Day the Earth Stood Still (1951), which was 
one of the few films to treat the aliens as benevolent. The film had a strong pacifist message, 
which tried to get humanity to step back from the brink of nuclear destruction. This pacifist and 
ecologically framed cult film is dramatized by the alien's ability to stop all artificial power on the 
planet. The aliens try to teach humans that they must learn to respect “nature” and stop their 
“senseless wars,” or face terrible consequences. 
2 (Post)modernism often uses the metaphor of viruses and disease to describe the state of 
anomie. Jameson and Baudrillard describe the postmodernist condition as “schizophrenic,” 
requiring “no experience of temporal continuity” (Rushing et al. 1995, 17). 
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previously inconceivable—illustrates the humility at the heart of the scientific 
endeavour. Classic narrative demands are rewarded however, when the individualised, 
jumped-up medical doctor (considered the lowest risk and therefore given the 
awesome responsibility of controlling the ignition key to nuclear destruction) deduces 
that the fast breathing of the baby who survived the incident somehow serves the 
process of avoiding contamination. The microbe later mutates and escapes the 
contamination room, triggering the base’s nuclear self-destruct mechanism. That the 
pathogen would multiply as a result of the nuclear blast and pose an existential threat to 
life on earth adds to the peril. The team manage to disable the device and the pathogen 
is exposed to clouds that will result in it coming into contact with sea water, rendering it 
harmless. Thus it is the inbuilt defence-mechanism of the Gaian earth system that serves 
to protect and save human life as opposed to the man-made, destructive power of 
nuclear fission. Like the human body’s immune system, the earth's greater immune 
system is fully dramatized, allowing audiences the filmic space and time to deduce its 
ecological potency. 
The Andromeda Strain can be read as a celebration of the virtues, specifically 
intellectual virtues, reified as scientific practice. It dramatises phronesis (practical 
wisdom or prudence). The film’s narrative concerns efforts to prevent an unknown 
pathogen wreaking havoc with life on earth. The protagonists are scientists and military 
experts trained to respond to such dangers, and the setting is a specially designed lab 
set up to contain microbial threats. This is the opposite of recklessness. The film then 
extols the virtue of temperance. Our protagonists are sober-minded, serious people. 
They are sound of mind. The scientists are open-minded—they study the pathogen 
calmly and forensically. They are sincere—they (mainly) act in good faith towards each 
other and towards their project. They exemplify a fidelity to the truth as revealed by 
empirical discovery and scientific consensus, similar to the current exploration of 
COVID-19. 
The scientists also possess humility. The conclusion of the movie critiques 
scientific hubris and orthodox thinking in the face of novel threats—the best safeguards 
humanity had conceived of (in the world of the film), had they not been halted, would 
have resulted in the destruction of life on earth. If, in the finale, the President had acted 
on the scientists’ logical deductions to wipe out Piedmont (the pre-designed site of the 
accident) with a nuclear deterrent, the alien life force would have used this “negative” 
energy to increase and multiply, rather than being destroyed. Humility then can be read 
as an intellectual virtue—we are willing to accept that we might be wrong, that we do 
not know everything. Without humility, we would never be able to admit when we are 
wrong, when we need to change course—without humility we would be incapable of 
responding when the evidence tells us that we have thus far been mistaken and we need 
to adapt.  
The scientific and military team are purified in preparation for an investigation 
of the virus within a secret underground research laboratory. Purity is a virtue often 
associated with the sacred; but in a scientific guise it is associated with cleanliness and 
hygiene. Instead of undergoing purification rituals in order to approach some sacred 
idol, now purity is used to protect us from malign biological material. This takes place in 
a scientifically “sacred” space, with complex rituals and instruments. Both visually and 
dramatically, this is a celebration of intellectual and scientific virtue.  
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This sort of purity is not feasible in the real-world. Nor would such a clinical 
purity be welcome, if we are being honest. But the virtues of fidelity (to the truth), open-
mindedness, and sincerity or good faith will be central if we are to overcome the 
challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Those making policy decisions must act in 
good faith. If they want the populations to follow them, those in charge must be 
honest—they must truthfully tell people what they believe. Questions of the viability of 
a vaccine, the hardships restrictions might impose, and impact of specific measures 
designed to combat the spread of the virus all require information given sincerely. 
Scientists and policymakers must be open-minded and be willing to look at new 
evidence, lest something vital is missed. Collectively, we must all retain a fidelity to the 
truth. We must combat misinformation and act according to what is truly the case, not 
what we wish it to be. If we are to achieve any sort of solidarity in the face of COVID-19, 
if we are to avoid the conflicts with each other that hinder our attempts to confront the 
virus, these virtues are a prerequisite.  
However, the ending, as mentioned above, is slightly more ambiguous: while it 
celebrates individual, rational decision-makers, it also suggests we need to be humble—
that even our best safeguards might be insufficient—that in the face of unknown natural 
events, all our endeavours and foresight might still require luck, and will require the 
protection of the earth system. 
Discussion 
As with any other aspect of individual or social life, responses to a pandemic, whether it 
is COVID-19 or the fictional MEV-1 will benefit from virtuous actions and will be 
hindered by vicious actions. We have seen the chaos caused by vicious responses—be it 
hubris, recklessness, or self-indulgence. Such vicious actions, and others, have allowed 
the virus to spread, leading to over three million deaths at the time of writing.  
 Politically, Aristotelian theory suggests society should be structured in such a 
way as to promote the flourishing of individuals. However, virtue ethics can extend 
beyond human individuals. That human flourishing should be the end, or telos, towards 
which human society aims is just one version of virtue ethics, based on one’s value 
system. For some environmental virtue ethicists (e.g. van Wensveen 1999; Cafaro 2015) 
all moral agents and living beings are valuable. In such theories, a virtue will be a 
character trait that is conducive to the flourishing of all living beings (Cafaro & Sandler 
2011). This might even be extended to ecosystems or the biosphere as a whole. 
However, in virtue traditions, the individual is not conceptualised as an isolated 
individual, but as someone who is dependent on their community. This dual focus on 
the individual and the collective is a major reason why virtue ethics provides such an 
ideal framework for exploring the ethical and political issues arising from pandemics.  
 COVID-19, like the stories of both Contagion and The Andromeda Strain, reveals 
to us the precariousness of human civilization. The relationship of humanity to the rest 
of nature should be an overriding concern when discussing novel disease outbreaks—
something both our filmic texts acknowledge. A healthy environment is vital for the 
flourishing of humanity. COVID-19 reminds us of this fact—and this uneasiness is a 
subtext of both Contagion and The Andromeda Strain.  
 COVID-19 is simply the latest in a number of novel disease outbreaks, that are 
thought to be increasing in frequency, and which result from human interference with 
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the natural world (Smith et al. 2014; IPBES 2020; WWF 2020). Both the United Nations 
and the World Health Organisation have argued that pandemics are the result of the 
destruction of nature (Carrington 2020). To assume that humanity can continue 
“business as usual” while our population expands, and we continue to degrade the 
environment—as we stand at the threshold of a climate (or even a temporal earth 
system) humanity has never experienced—is to commit an act of great hubris. If we 
view COVID-19 and other mass-disease outbreaks experienced by humanity in the last 
number of decades from an environmental perspective, they begin to look much like 
“punishment” for our hubris in regard to nature.  The alternative theory—that the virus 
was modified in a laboratory and then escaped—is also an example of hubris, though of 
a more common variety (and nor would it undermine the more general point about 
human hubris in relation to nature). 
 The prudential course of action then would be to change our destructive 
behaviour towards the rest of nature. The fissure caused by COVID-19 in our modus 
vivendi represents a chance to change course. There is an opportunity to rebuild our 
economies, ensuring that they are less environmentally destructive, as demonstrated by 
the EU’s interest in a “Green Deal” (European Commission 2019). Indeed, it has been 
suggested that GDP should no longer be the focus of post-COVID economics (Bailey et al. 
2020). Given that COVID-19 has been described as an “SOS signal for the human 
enterprise” by the UN’s environment chief (Dasgupta & Andersen 2020), the prudent 
thing to do would be to change course. To do otherwise would be imprudent. 
 Changing course like this would, however, require us to act with humility. To 
accept that, despite technological progress and great wealth for so many individuals, 
our collective way of life is destructive, to ourselves and to the environment on which 
we are reliant, requires humility. We do not mean individual humility but a collective 
humility. Acting for a collective good is one of the greatest challenges of responding to a 
pandemic, and to the many environmental crises we face. Western moral and political 
frameworks have been built on theoretical foundations that prioritise the rational 
individual, rather than any collective. Our practices thus prioritise each individual 
pursuing their own conception of the good. This can result in practices that produce 
collective harms, such as environmental breakdown and increased risk of pandemics.  
The practices that contemporary human society has developed are leading to 
what is being called the 6th Mass Extinction event. We destroy habitats and wipe out 
species, and call it progress. To give two examples: it has recently been revealed that 
40% of the world’s plants are at risk of extinction (Antonelli et al. 2020); whales are at 
risk of extinction (Briggs 2020). Unfortunately, countless more examples can be 
provided. These are not only tragedies in themselves, but they are part of a trend—
humans driving life on earth to extinction—that threatens us (Dasgupta & Andersen) 
and is likely to result in more pandemics (WWF 2020). Just as the human immune 
system is struggling to adapt to COVID-19, the Gaian system (the saviour in The 
Andromeda Strain) is struggling with human proliferation. 
These crises are made all the more challenging in that they are collective action 
problems, with climate change being characterised as the “paradigmatic longitudinal 
collective action environmental problem” (Sandler 2009, 168), and require collective 
solutions. Collective action problems arise as a result of individual interests conflicting 
with the best interests of the group. Environmental collective problems “arise from the 
cumulative unintended (and often unforeseen or unforeseeable) effects of a vast 
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amount of seemingly insignificant decisions and actions by individuals who are 
unknown to each other and distant from each other (spatially, temporally, and socially)” 
(Sandler, 168). Such problems can in turn result in a “problem of inconsequentialism” 
whereby people’s individual contributions to fixing the problem appear to be so 
insignificant (and sometimes impose costs) that people lose any incentive to take such 
actions (Sandler 2009; Knights 2019).   
Virtue ethicists have argued that virtue-oriented ethical approaches are better 
able to respond to the problem of inconsequentialism (Sandler 2009; Knights 2019). 
Virtue theories are perhaps better able to confront these dilemmas as “virtue-oriented 
ethical theory has the resources to justify modifying one’s behavior in response to 
longitudinal collective action problems even if others are not likely to do so, which is 
crucial if one is to set an example or lead others to change” (Sandler 2009, 178).  
Virtue ethics is particularly adept at providing a means of escaping the 
dichotomy of the individually rational and the collectively rational by focusing on the 
way in which the individual person is dependent on others (Hourdequin 2010, 457). For 
instance, Alasdair MacIntyre argues that our flourishing as autonomous adults requires 
us to understand and acknowledge that we have been dependent on others (individuals 
and social networks), and that our flourishing as independent reasoners requires us to 
acknowledge this (MacIntyre 1999). This requires us to practice the virtues of 
acknowledged dependence—virtues connected with justice and generosity, with 
receiving with good grace and giving without expectation of immediate reward. The 
practice of these virtues, McIntyre argues, will help us flourish as individuals and help 
us understand that we are not always self-sufficient, and in doing this, will help us 
understand our role as members of a larger community, a network that supports us 
through giving and receiving (MacIntyre 1999). MacIntyre’s insights can be applied to 
humanity’s interactions with the rest of the natural world (Hannis 2015). Building on 
MacIntyre’s virtues of acknowledged dependence, the virtues of acknowledged 
ecological dependence begin with the fact that both humans and non-human animals 
“are all vulnerable physical creatures who flourish only in particular physical 
conditions” (Hannis 2015, 151). 
 Science Fiction narratives, such as Contagion and The Andromeda Strain are here 
extremely significant. Our lives then make sense only in the context of larger life stories, 
the stories of our civilisation and our species, and ultimately life on earth. Storytelling is 
a universal human practice, integral to the creation and sustaining of our social and 
political collectives.  
Our two filmic texts dramatise our ecological dependence and celebrate the 
relatively small acts of individuals that contribute to the overcoming of the fictional 
threats. They remind us that humanity’s position of dominance might not be permanent. 
However, our social and moral life is dominated by anthropocentric ideals, in which 
only humans have intrinsic value (and which presuppose the ontological centrality of 
humanity on earth) and by faith in the power of science, technology and the inevitability 
of progress. In this sense, our larger narrative might be corrupted by the vice of hubris. 
Contemporary society owes much to the Enlightenment—with its disdain for magical 
thinking, its faith in science and technological progress, and its exaltation of the rational 
individual. Western societies, benefitting from technological development, abide by 
social contracts between citizens. Science and trade have seen wealth and health 
increase in most developed nations. This is a story of progress, seemingly without end.  
O’Brolcháin and Brereton: Learning from COVID-19 
 
Journal of Science Fiction and Philosophy  Vol. 4: 2021 
 
11 
COVID-19 forces us to question the narrative of ceaseless progress. As well as 
being exacerbated by human hubris, the disease outbreak might also have its origin in 
human hubris. There are myriad examples of hubris in human relations, but the 
relationship of humanity with the natural world is almost wholly characterised by 
hubris. Within modern political theories and mainstream moral theories, the natural 
world is accorded no moral status and at best only instrumental value. Indeed, the 
concept of the Anthropocene—a human-dominated geological epoch (Lewis & Maslin 
2015)—has been criticised as celebrating human dominion over the natural 
environment (Crist 2013). 
Cinematic stories about pandemics or the threats posed by new pathogens allow 
us to explore the solidity of our technologically-advanced societies. The threats they 
dramatise reveal our vulnerability, and the solutions they suggest—being responsive to 
the facts, collective (scientific) cooperation—are useful exemplars. However, both films 
might be guilty of a secondary type of hubris. Both films illustrate the threat posed by 
the monstrous flourishing of a novel pathogen, revealing the precarity of human 
civilisation. Both show how collective endeavour and rational practice is required to 
discover the solution to this threat. However, as we have seen from COVID-19, the 
scientific solution is merely the first step. With COVID-19, the scientific community has 
been thus extremely successful in creating vaccines that promise (at the time of writing) 
to end the crisis. However, the distribution of the vaccine has resulted in rows and 
conflicts—notably between the European Union and the United Kingdom, as each tries 
to claim as many vaccines as possible. As ever, the wealthier nations have taken the 
lion’s share of the vaccines, with the poorer nations left with inadequate supplies. 
According to research carried out by Duke University, “just four nations or regions with 
less than half the world’s population have administered seventy percent of all COVID-19 
vaccine doses, while the poorest countries have barely begun vaccinating due to lack of 
funding and supply” (McClellan et al. 2021). To this, we can also add the resistance of 
significant amounts of the population to vaccination. Our filmic texts present scientific 
success as the climactic success, but in the real world, scientific success does not herald 
a meaningful pursuit of collective flourishing.  
In this sense the films are very much Enlightenment texts, in that they share the 
Enlightenment’s sense of optimism that reason and technological development can save 
humanity. It is becoming more apparent however, that scientists and technology may 
well be necessary but are not sufficient. This would not surprise ancient Greek thinkers, 
such as Aristotle. The practice of virtue should not be confined to scientific spheres, it 
will be needed in the political realm too. Our films are perhaps guilty of being too 
Hollywood in neglecting this.  
Nonetheless, virtues such as the ones outlined can serve as a guide to individuals 
and policy-makers. The Andromeda Strain illustrates some of the virtues that we require 
if we are to avoid catastrophe as a result of newly emergent pathogens.  
Conclusion 
It is in this space that eco-films are so effective and so unsettling. By presenting a vision 
of a flourishing inimical to human flourishing—the flourishing of a virus or of an alien 
pathogen—both films illustrate how human civilisation can be threatened by a 
monstrous flourishing. This then is an inhuman flourishing, whereby the flourishing of 
some other part of nature—terrestrial or alien—comes at the expense of humanity. Our 
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narratives about this perhaps suggest a collective unease with the downside of human 
flourishing, that it comes at the expense of the rest of life of earth. Ecological vice inverts 
the idea of human scientific achievement leading to progress and underscores the 
hubris inherent in the idea of the conquest of nature. That our collective vice results in a 
monstrous flourishing is a frightening inversion of our Enlightenment beliefs regarding 
human progress via scientific achievement. This frightening reflection as dramatically 
shown to audiences means pandemic stories such as Contagion and The Andromeda 
Strain serve to haunt audiences, despite ostensibly optimistic denouements.  
The thrill of pandemic films lies in their ability to dramatise the tensions of 
scientific discovery, illustrating the risks we face from a dangerous world and from our 
own poor decisions, while providing us with catharsis (Aristotle 2013), a purging of the 
fears raised by scientific revelations about the risks we face both as individuals and as a 
society. As Aristotle knew, catharsis—by giving people an opportunity to purge negative 
emotions and thereby purify themselves—performs an essential public role. Indeed, 
narrative plays a central part in embodying virtue ethics. Virtue ethics has a 
fundamentally teleological aspect which requires us to give serious thought to what 
constitutes flourishing and how we will achieve this. Narratives, including our pandemic 
films play a central part of this and provide a coherent framework to our understanding 
of our telos. Cinema is one of our most effective ways of creating our collective 
narratives—suggesting to us that our place in the world is not so secure as we would 
like to suppose. Indeed, narratives of pandemics can in some way be seen as providing a 
counter-narrative to our Enlightenment myth of the triumph of humanity.  
An advantage narratives have in relation to analytic philosophy (aside from 
accessibility) is that they can be ambiguous in a way analytic philosophy cannot be.  
Here they are most telling. Whilst they celebrate the virtues of heroic individuals and 
humanity’s collective scientific and technological achievements, they reveal anxieties 
about the effect of these achievements. They dramatise the unwelcome truths that 
science has revealed to us and that the Enlightenment narratives about rational man 
and endless progress avoid—that our place on Earth is contingent, that we are 
vulnerable. Our own success might contain the seeds of our downfall, or “Nature” might 
present us with something which will wipe us out. In these ways, the films discussed 
dovetail nicely with issues of climate change, just as COVID-19 can be “read” as a 
warning from nature.  
Pandemics, such as COVID-19, upend classic Hollywood narratives with their 
linear trajectory and necessity for individual heroes and clear resolution. We have seen 
whole societies go into lock down—with almost all normal aspects of social and political 
life coming to a standstill. This pandemic reveals the fragility of our societies—while 
movies such as Contagion suggest to us that the social contract governing society is 
itself fragile. Viruses precede humanity and so have been with us throughout our 
history, but our awareness of them is extremely recent—they were discovered by 
scientists in the 1890s. They exemplify a darker side of the Enlightenment quest for 
knowledge—the discovery of something potentially terrible. Knowledge itself becomes 
terrifying. Yet we must retain a fidelity to the truth—deluding ourselves, allowing 
ourselves to fall to nicely-presented fake solutions will only entrench our difficulties. 
This is particularly germane now that it is apparent that our current practices, which 
due to technological developments now have a global impact, are not virtuous from an 
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environmental perspective (a perspective that is truly informed by science) and 
undermine the conditions necessary for our flourishing.  
Being shown the limitations of our technological society is deeply unsettling. 
Hovering at the edge of our collective consciousness when considering COVID-19 is the 
idea that it reveals the truth about our position in nature. We are one species amongst 
millions of others, and just as vulnerable. We are not as in control of nature as we like to 
tell ourselves; progress is not inevitable; our world and continued existence in it is 
fragile. In this sense, pandemics suggest the sublime: “Whatever is fitted in any sort to 
excite the ideas of pain, and danger, that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is 
conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a 
source of the sublime; that is, it is productive of the strongest emotion which the mind is 
capable of feeling. . ." (Burke 1757/2015). The pandemic suggests that we are 
encountering the environmental sublime. 
Flourishing, as the ancients told us, will only be achieved if we live virtuously. 
This drama has been played out in science fiction films numerous times and is all the 
more apparent in the age of COVID-19. Practical wisdom, temperance and humility 
together will mean that humanity can work with its environment to save itself from 





Antonelli, A., Fry, C., Smith, R. J., Simmonds, M. S. J., Kersey, P. J., Pritchard, H. W., Abbo, 
M. S., Acedo, C., Adams, J., Ainsworth, A. M., Allkin, B., Annecke, W., Bachman, S. P., 
Bacon, K., Bárrios, S., Barstow, C., Battison, A., Bell, E., Bensusan, K., … Zhang, B. G. 
2020. State of the World’s Plants and Fungi 2020. Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew. 
https://doi.org/10.34885/172 
Aristotle. 2013. Poetics. Oxford University Press. 
https://global.oup.com/academic/product/poetics-
9780199608362?cc=ie&lang=en& 
Bailey, A., Carney, M., Galhau, F. V. de, & Elderson, F. 2020. “The world must seize this 
opportunity to meet the climate challenge.” The Guardian. 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jun/05/world-climate-
breakdown-pandemic 
Blake, J. 2020, October 16. “Covid: Andy Burnham holding the government ‘over a 
barrel’, says Raab.” BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-54566717 
Brereton, P. 2019. Environmental Literacy and New Digital Audiences. Routledge. 
Briggs, H. 2020. “‘Real and imminent’ extinction risk to whales.” BBC News. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-54485407 
O’Brolcháin and Brereton: Learning from COVID-19 
 
Journal of Science Fiction and Philosophy  Vol. 4: 2021 
 
14 
Burke, E. 2015. A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the 
Beautiful (P. Guyer, Ed.; Second Edition). Oxford University Press. 
Cafaro, P. 2005. “Gluttony, Arrogance, Greed and Apathy, an Exploration of 
Environmental Vice.” In Environmental Virtue Ethics. Edited by R. L. Sandler & P. 
Cafaro. Rowman & Littlefield. 
Cafaro, P. 2015. “Environmental Virtue Ethics.” In The Routledge Companion to Virtue 
Ethics. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203071755.ch31 
Cafaro, P., & Sandler, R. (Eds.). 2011. Virtue Ethics and the Environment. Springer 
Netherlands. https://www.springer.com/gb/book/9789400702264 
Carrington, D. 2020. “Pandemics result from destruction of nature, say UN and WHO.” 
The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/17/pandemics-
destruction-nature-un-who-legislation-trade-green-recovery 
Comte-Sponville, A. 2003. A Short Treatise on the Great Virtues. Vintage. 
Crist, E. 2013. “On the Poverty of Our Nomenclature.” Environmental Humanities, 3(1), 
129–147. https://doi.org/10.1215/22011919-3611266 
Cubitt, S. 2005. Ecocinema. Rodolphi Press. 
Dasgupta, P., & Andersen, I. 2020, June 5. “Covid-19 is nature sending us a message—We 




European Commission. 2019. “A European Green Deal” [Text]. European Commission. 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-
deal_en 
Hannis, M. 2015. “The Virtues of Acknowledged Ecological Dependence: Sustainability, 
Autonomy and Human Flourishing.” Environmental Values, 24(2), 145–164. 
https://doi.org/10.3197/096327114X13947900181437 
Hiltner, K. 2018. Ecocriticism: The Essential Reader. MIT Press. 
Hourdequin, M. 2010. “Climate, Collective Action and Individual Ethical Obligations.” 
Environmental Values, 19(4), 443–464. 
IPBES, (Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Services). 2020. “COVID-19 Stimulus Measures Must Save Lives, Protect 
Livelihoods, and Safeguard Nature to Reduce the Risk of Future Pandemics.” 
https://ipbes.net/covid19stimulus 
Knights, P. 2019. “Inconsequential Contributions to Global Environmental Problems: A 
Virtue Ethics Account.” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 32(4), 
527–545. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-019-09796-x 
Lawton, G. 2020, October 24. “Absurd about the Herd.” New Scientist, 3305, 23. 
Lehane, M. 2020. “NPHET recommends Level 5 restrictions for whole country.” 
https://www.rte.ie/news/2020/1004/1169272-coronarvirus-ireland/ 
O’Brolcháin and Brereton: Learning from COVID-19 
 
Journal of Science Fiction and Philosophy  Vol. 4: 2021 
 
15 
Lewis, S. L., & Maslin, M. A. 2015. “Defining the Anthropocene.” Nature, 519(7542), 171–
180. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature14258 
MacIntyre, A. 1981. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (3rd Ed.). Bloomsbury. 
MacIntyre, A. 1999. Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues. 
Duckworth. 
McClellan, M., Udayakumar, K., Merson, M., & Edson, G. 2021. “Reducing Global COVID 
Vaccine Shortages: New Research and Recommendations for US Leadership.” 
Duke Margolis Center for Health Policy, Duke Global health Institute, Duke Global 
Health Innovation Center.  
https://healthpolicy.duke.edu/publications/reducing-global-covid-vaccine-
shortages-new-research-and-recommendations-us-leadership 
Robbins, J. 2012, July 14. “The Ecology of Disease.” The New York Times. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/sunday-review/the-ecology-of-
disease.html 
RTE. 2020. “Country moving to Level 5 restrictions for six weeks.” 
https://www.rte.ie/news/coronavirus/2020/1019/1172397-coronavirus-
ireland/ 
Sandler, R. 2009. “Ethical Theory and the Problem of Inconsequentialism: Why 
Environmental Ethicists Should be Virtue-Oriented Ethicists.” Journal of 
Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 23(1), 167. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-009-9203-4 
Smith, K. F., Goldberg, M., Rosenthal, S., Carlson, L., Chen, J., Chen, C., & Ramachandran, S. 
2014. “Global rise in human infectious disease outbreaks.” Journal of the Royal 
Society Interface, 11(101). https://doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2014.0950 




Weik Von Mossner, A. 2017. Affective Ecologies. The Ohio State University Press. 
WWF, W. W. F. 2020. “COVID Action: For Nature, For Us.” WWF. 
https://explore.panda.org/pandemics 
 
 
 
 
